In this paper we generalize the results of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to mixedduopolies. We show that quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes not only in the case of private firms but also when a public firm is involved.
1 fails to hold. 1 Furthermore, Reynolds and Wilson (2000) introduced demand uncertainty to the model and pointed out that equilibrium capacities are not equal to the Cournot quantities. In their model the uncertainty prevails only at the time when firms choose capacities. However, at the beginning of the second stage the demand is observed and prices are set in a deterministic way. 2 On the other hand, when uncertainty persists in the price-setting stage, de Frutos and Fabra (2011) illustrate that under mild assumptions the total welfare is equivalent to the Cournot case, yet the capacity levels are asymmetric even when firms are ex-ante identical. Wauthy (2000 and 2004) generalize Kreps and Scheinkman's (1983) result to multi-player markets assuming efficient rationing and identical cost functions. Moreover, under similar conditions Loertscher (2008) proves that the equivalence result holds when firms compete in the input and the output market at the same time. More recently, Wu, Zhu and Sun (2012) generalized the celebrated equivalency result by relaxing the assumptions imposed on the demand and cost functions.
In this paper we extend the Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) result to the case in which a private firm competes with a public firm, that is, to the case of a so-called mixed duopoly. The idea of mixed oligopolies as a possible form of regulation was introduced by Merrill and Schneider (1966) . Its relevance stems from the possibility of increasing social welfare through the presence of a public firm in the market. Indeed, it is common to observe public and private firms competing in the same industry. 3 As for studies of mixed oligopolies, the Cournot game was examined by Harris and Wiens (1980) , Beato and Mas-Colell (1984) , Cremer, Marchand and Thisse (1989) and de Fraja and Delbono (1989) . Balogh and Tasnádi (2012) studied the price-setting game for given capacities. Therefore, in order to extend the Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) result for mixed duopolies, the solution of the capacity game is required. For linear demand and cost functions this solution was given by Bakó and Tasnádi (2014) , but that requires the private firm to be more cost-efficient than the public firm. However, as we will see, in the case of strictly convex cost and general demand functions there is no need for such an assumption. 4 In the remainder of the paper we first present our setup and then solve the mixed Cournot game followed by the results on the price-setting game. Finally, we determine the equilibrium capacity levels and summarize our results.
1 For more about rationing rules see, for instance, Vives (1999 ) or Wolfstetter (1999 . 2 Lepore (2012) generalizes Reynolds and Wilson (2000) results for a wide range of demand uncertainties with different rationing rules.
3 A few notable examples for public firms are: the Kiwibank, which is a state owned commercial bank in New-Zealand; Amtrak, the railway company in USA; the Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Limited, which is owned by the Indian Government; the Norwegian Statoil, owned in 60% by the national government; or in the aviation industry Aeroflot, Air New-Zealand, Finnair, Qatar Airways are all owned in majority by their national government.
4 Tomaru and Kiyono (2010) analyzes the linear and convex case separately in timing games for mixed duopolies for exactly the same reason.
The Model
Consider a mixed duopoly in which two firms, A and B, produce perfectly substitutable products. Firm A is a private firm and maximizes its profit, while Firm B is a public firm and aims to maximize total surplus.
The market demand function is given by D on which we impose the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 (i) D intersects the horizontal axis at quantity a and the vertical axis at price b; (ii) D is strictly decreasing, concave and twice-continuously differentiable on (0, a); (iii) D is right-continuous at 0 and left-continuous at b; and (iv) D(p) = 0 for all p ≥ b.
Note, that based on this assumption none of the firms sets its price above b. Denote by P the inverse demand function, that is P (q) = D −1 (q) for 0 < q ≤ a, P (0) = b, and P (q) = 0 for all q > a.
The firms cost functions are given by C i (i = A, B) and we assume that:
is strictly increasing, convex and twice-continuously differentiable on [0, ∞).
The mixed Cournot duopoly
The private firm is a profit-maximizer and its profit function can be given as:
while the public firm intends to maximize social welfare, hence its objective function is as follows:
In equilibrium firms produce quantities which satisfy the equation system derived from the first order conditions:
The social welfare for this example is depicted in Figure 1 by the shaded area when firms produce quantities q A = 1/2 and q B = 1/3.
Figure 1: Social welfare in a mixed Cournot duopoly.
The mixed Kreps-Scheinkman game
Now, we assume that firms are involved in the following two-stage game: firstly they choose their capacity level simultaneously and non-cooperatively and secondly they compete in a Bertrand fashion. Moreover, we assume that firms can produce up to their capacity levels at zero unit cost in the subsequent production stage, however producing beyond their capacity levels is impossible (or stated otherwise, unit costs rise discontinuously to infinity).
To solve the game we use backward induction. Suppose that in the first stage firms install capacities k A and k B and these decisions are common knowledge. Without loss of generality we can assume that k A , k B ∈ [0, a]. Taking capacities as given, we analyze the price-setting game in which firms choose their prices p i ∈ [0, P (0)] (i = A, B) to maximize their payoffs.
To determine firms' demand and profit functions, we employ the efficient rationing rule. 5 The firm which sets the lower price faces the market demand, while the firm with the higher price has a residual demand of
In the case of p A = p B the following tie-breaking rule is used for mixed duopolies: if prices are higher than a threshold p (explicitly determined later on) the demand is allocated in proportion of the firms' capacities, however if prices are not higher than p the public firm allows the private firm to serve the entire demand up to its capacity level. 6 Formally,
Firms' objective functions can be given as:
and
where
Note that, since capacities are set in the first stage of the game and their costs are already sunk, firms objective functions are free of costs.
For Example 1 we illustrate firms' profits and consumers' surplus in Figure 2 . The lightest-grey triangle corresponds to the surplus realized by the consumers who purchase the product at the highest price, while the light-grey area depicts the surplus realized by the other consumers. On the producers' side, the low-price firm's surplus is given by the darkest-grey rectangular and the high-price firm's surplus by the dark-grey area. Note that total welfare is determined by the higher price, except when the residual demand equals zero at the higher price.
Let us denote the market clearing price by p c and the firm i's (i = A, B) unique revenue maximizing price on the firm's residual demand curve by p m i , hence:
Furthermore, let p d i be the lowest price satisfying equation
For prices higher than p we could have used many other tie-breaking rules, e.g. the tie-breaking rule used by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) , the only requirement is that none of the firms should have the possibility to serve the market entirely. For more about the employed tie-breaking rule we refer to Balogh and Tasnádi (2012) . 
, whenever p d i is well defined. 8
Solving the price-setting game
In this subgame k A and k B are given parameters. If p m A ≥ p c , firms set equilibrium prices as follows:
, where p M is the price set by a monopolist without capacity constraints, i.e. p M = arg max p∈[0,P (0)] pD(p), the following price-profiles are also part of the equilibrium:
7 To abbreviate our expressions we omit the variables kA and kB of D If, however p m A < p c , in equilibrium firms set prices as follows:
Henceforward, we will refer to the first case (p m A ≥ p c ) as the strong private firm case and to the latter (p m A < p c ) as the weak private firm case. At this point we can already define p introduced before Equation (4): let p = p d A if p m A ≥ p c and p = 0 otherwise. In the strong private firm case the equilibrium given by (7) Pareto dominates the one given by (8). Furthermore, the not always existing (9) describes situations when the public firm is inactive. Therefore in what follows we consider (7) as the solution of the price-setting game in the strong private firm case. 9 Hence, firms' equilibrium quantities can be given as:
The capacity-choice game
Let us denote the set of capacity-profiles compatible with the weak private firm case as
and with the strong private firm case as
Notice that K c is a closed set, since p m A and P are continuous. To determine p d A , first we need to consider p m A , which by definition is the price maximizing p(D(p) − k B ). 10 That is, p m A satisfies the following first order condition:
Based on Assumption 1, ∂π r A ∂p is strictly decreasing, p m A is unique and, as it can be checked easily, p m A is independent from k A . The boundary curve dividing the strong and the weak private firm case is given by
, which is the case because the left-hand side is independent of k ′ A and the right-hand side is decreasing in k ′ A . Thus, for every k B there exists a k * A such that the projection of
9 For more details on selecting (7) as the most plausible equilibrium we refer to Balogh and Tasnádi (2012) .
10 Bear in mind that we have to consider the case kB = a separately. In this situation p We show that the boundary curve, which is defined by the implicit equation
, is strictly decreasing in (k A , k B ). The implicit equation defining the boundary curve can be expressed as
from which under Assumption 1 by the Implicit Function Theorem we obtain
Furthermore, let us divide K d into two subsets as follows:
We turn to determining the projection of the set K d 2 for any given k B . The condition
. We thus define:
where c = π r A (p m A ) depends only on k B . While the sign of f ′ is ambiguous, f ′′ > 0, that is f is strictly convex. Moreover, lim k A →0 + f (k A ) = ∞ and f (a) > 0. Let us denote the capacity levels on the boundary of sets K c and
. It can be shown that f (k ′ A ) < 0, thus for any given k B there exists a k * A so that the projection of the set K d 2 equals (k * A , a]. Based on these results Figure 3 illustrates the spatial arrangement of
A is defined by the minimum price satisfying the following condition:
Note, however, that this latter case cannot be part of the equilibria, since p d A given by (14) is independent of k A , and for that reason the private firm could increase its profit by choosing a lower capacity level equal to
Figure 3: Set of capacities Given the equilibrium prices, for any (k A , k B ) capacity profile the firms' objective functions are as follows:
For simplicity we neglect the arguments k A and k B of functions p d A and p c , moreover, we did not substitute the already determined expressions for these functions in the objective functions.
Since solutions from K c and K d 1 dominate the capacity levels from K d 2 we focus our attention only on K c and K d 1 . However, by determining
1 we can exclude capacities belonging to K d 1 as well. To see this, consider the private firm's profit function on the above mentioned interval:
Hence, π A is decreasing in k A on K d 1 for any given k B , which implies that the equilibrium solution is necessary in K c .
Notice that the objective functions given by (15) and (16) are identical to (1) and (2) determined for the mixed Cournot duopoly case. Yet, we have to show that the equilibrium Cournot outcomes are in set K c as well. To do so, let us express the second period residual profit function defining p m A in terms of quantities and maximize: 
Observe that P (q m A + k B ) coincides with p m A , since we have solved the same profit maximization problem in two different ways. If we compare (17) with the first equation of (3) we can see that for any k B ∈ [0, a) we have p m A = p c . Therefore, for capacities given by P (q m A + k B ) = p c we have
(q m A , k B ) < 0, and thus taking Assumptions 1 and 2 into account, we can see that the first order conditions given by (3) are satisfied within K c .
We summarize our results as follows:
